Measuring the Consequences of Delegate Selection Rules in Presidential Nominations by Ansolabehere, Stephen Daniel & King, Gary
 
Measuring the Consequences of Delegate Selection
Rules in Presidential Nominations
 
The Harvard community has made this article openly
available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story
matters.
Citation Ansolabehere, Stephen Daniel, and Gary King. 1990.
Measuring the consequences of delegate selection rules in





Accessed February 18, 2015 6:48:15 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4320047
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's
DASH repository, and is made available under the terms
and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set
forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAAMeasuring the Consequences of Delegate 
Selection Rules in Presidential Nominations 
Stephen Ansolabehere 
University of California, Los Angeles 
Gary King 
Harvard University 
In this paper, we formalize existing normative criteria used to judge  presidential selection 
contests by modeling the translation of citizen votes in primaries and caucuses into delegates to 
the national party conventions. We use a statistical model that enables us to separate the form of 
electoral responsiveness in presidential selection systems, as well as the degree of bias toward 
each of the candidates. We find that (1) the Republican nomination system is more responsive to 
changes in citizen votes than the Democratic system; (2) non-PR primaries are always more re- 
sponsive than PR primaries; (3) surprisingly, caucuses are more proportional than even prima- 
ries held under PR rules; (4) significant bias in favor of a candidate was a good prediction of the 
winner of the nomination contest. We also (3) evaluate the claims of Ronald Reagan in 1976 and 
Jesse Jackson in  1988 that the selection systems were substantially biased against their candi- 
dates. We find no evidence to support Reagan's claim, but substantial evidence that Jackson was 
correct. 
INTRODUCTION 
Our  knowledge of the effects of presidential selection rules derives from a 
combination of scholarly literature, participant reports, and reformers' pleas. 
Most writers see selection rules as defining the fairness of the system, con- 
trolling the speed with which a presidential nomination is decided, influenc- 
ing who is nominated, and affecting the outcome of the general election con- 
test in  November. The work produced by these writers is  quite large, and 
the historical  and contextual detail  is  impressive.  Nevertheless,  the nor- 
mative criteria are often ambiguous and systematic empirical evidence is fre- 
quently lacking. 
We formalize existing normative criteria used to judge presidential selec- 
tion contests by modeling the translation of citizen votes in primaries and 
caucuses  into delegates to the national party  conventions. We apply our 
model to data from 1976 to 1988. Our work thus begins where the studies of 
primary voting behavior (Bartels 1988), candidate strategies (Aldrich 1980), 
The authors gratefully acknowledge  NSF grants SES-87-22713 and SES-89-09201 to Gary 
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and media behavior (Brady and Johnston  1987) in presidential nomination 
contests leave off. We take voter choice as given and consider how the pri- 
mary and caucus vote is translated into delegates. This enables us to ascer- 
tain  the precise effects of  delegate selection rules on the fairness and es- 
sential character of  the parties  nominating systems.  Our statistical  model 
enables us to judge the fairness of the selection system to individual candi- 
dates and ideological programs, as well as to determine the responsiveness of 
the system to voter preferences. 
In this section, we identify normative criterion in the presidential selec- 
tion literature, and we simultaneously develop a statistical model that incor- 
porates each and enables us to estimate their levels and directions. Part of an 
article by Geer (1986, 1007-14)  is the only previous delegates-votes model 
of presidential selection rules of which we are aware. As  we explain below, 
responsiveness is a theoretical concept that refers to an entire electoral sys- 
tem, and it discriminates among the candidates only by their relative vote 
percentages (instead of their names). Unfortunately, Geer allows  "respon- 
siveness" and bias to vary from candidate to candidate; he therefore has pure 
definitions and measures  of  neither concept.'  In spite of  these problems, 
Geer stays close to his data and therefore arrives at several important conclu- 
sions, some of which we confirm. Below, we correct for the above problems, 
introduce a more general statistical model, add Democratic caucus data, and 
update the analysis to 1988. 
In all of the literature, perhaps the most commonly mentioned, though 
not universally supported, normative criteria is proportional representation 
(PR)  (Ceaser 1979, 260-304).  The basic idea is that national party convention 
delegates should be allocated in proportion  to the votes they receive in  a 
state: Let V.,. be the proportion of votes candidate j receives in state i. DV is 
the proportion of delegates state i allocates to candidate j. Then 
D..  = v, 
3)  0  (1) 
for all candidates j (j  = 1, . .  . , Ji)  competing in  state i (i = 1, . . . , 50). 
However, even if  a state counts votes on the statewide level and carefully 
'Geer also  purports  to measure  three concepts-responsiveness,  bias,  and threshold  ef- 
fects-but  since his statistical model includes only two parameters he can only be measuring 
two of the three (probably the first two). Furthermore, for both statistical reasons (as explained 
by Brady and Ansolabehere 1988) and intuitive ones (as understood by survey researchers and 
journalists  using "trial heats"),  pairwise comparisons is a better way to study multicandidate 
decision processes than his practice of comparing each candidate with the sum of the others. In 
addition, since Geer provides no standard errors for his estimates, one cannot tell which is a 
systematic (and statistically significant) effect and which is due to the usual random fluctuations 
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tries to allocate delegates proportionally, equation 1 may not hold exactly 
due to rounding error, applying PR only within congressional districts, using 
vote thresholds, and other features of presidential selection rules. Thus, as a 
normative standard, equation 1 is  too strict. Instead, we can think of this 
allocation rule occurring only in expectation: 
This is also portrayed for just two candidates by the 45-degree line in figure 1. 
Whereas dark horse candidates  seem to prefer PR,  party  professionals 
usually favor systems where the allocation of delegates is very responsive to 
changes in  voter preferences  (Sanford  1981; Kirkpatrick,  Malbin,  Mann, 
Penniman,  and  Ranney  1980). A  responsive  system  is  one where  small 
changes in voter preferences lead to relatively large changes in  candidate 
support among a state's delegation to the national party convention. Further- 
more, a highly responsive nomination system is likely to lead to an early vic- 
tory by a presidential candidate if votes follow some autoregressive process, 
as would be described by campaign "momentum" (Bartels 1988), or if voters 612  Stephen Ansolabehere and Gary King 
do not change their preferences but clearly do prefer one of the candidates.' 
Party professionals  (and likely  frontrunners) prefer early nomination  deci- 
sions because it seems to increase the chances for a victory  in November 
(Lengle and Shafer 1976; Lengle 1981, 85-99;  Keech and Matthews 1976; 
David and Ceaser 1980, 69-74).  One reason for this is that an early decision 
gives the nominee more time to prepare for the Fall campaign. An early de- 
cision is also often synonymous with a less divisive primary season (or at least 
with a shorter divisive season). 
If  PR is one's  standard for fairness, then the goal of winning the White 
House and a responsive electoral system are incompatible. We avoid this di- 
lemma by extending the concept of  "partisan symmetry"  (see Tufte  1973; 
Grofman  1983; Niemi 1985; King and Browning  1987; and King 198913) to 
"candidate symmetry" in presidential nominations: If a candidate receives a 
certain allocation of convention delegates for a given proportion of votes in a 
state, then another candidate, if he or she were to receive the same propor- 
tion of votes,  should receive the same allocation of  convention  delegates. 
This is of course a hypothetical relationship, except in the case where two 
candidates actually receive the same proportion  of the vote, but it can be 
modeled (and later estimated) nonetheless. 
One way to formalize the idea of candidate symmetry is to use the model 
studied by Theil (1969) and Qualter (1968). They portray a large variety of 
these symmetric curves with the following functional relationship for party 
(or in our case candidate)j for j = 1, . . . , 1,: 
This equation is a straightforward generalization of PR because if p = 1, it 
reduces directly to equation 2. For any value of p, this equation allocates 
convention delegates symmetrically and thus fairly among the candidates. 
Another special case of this equation is when p +  w. This winner-take-all 
system is portrayed in figure 1  for a two-candidate contest; in this system, as 
soon as a candidate gets greater than 50% of the vote, he or she gets all of the 
convention delegates. This type of system is "fair," since it treats all the can- 
didates equally, but since presidential nominations are generally intended to 
be inclusive  processes,  official  statewide winner-take-all rules have  been 
eliminated. However, a winner-take-all rule could also operate in practice 
under almost any other system if voters have homogeneous preferences and 
happen to always vote as a bloc. 
'In  the unlikely event that a majority of voters do not support a single candidate und voter 
preferences do not change over the course of the primary season, a responsive system will not 
increase the probability of wrapping up the nomination early. Note also that these are tenden- 
cies only; even a very responsive system can sometimes lead to very long nomination battles in a 
particular  contest. Delegate Selection Rules in Presidential Nominations  6  13 
Values of p between one and infinity portray systems with varying degrees 
of responsiveness; the higher p the more responsiveness. Figure 1  gives an 
example of  p = 3. This  hypothetical  electoral  system is  quite responsive 
since, near the middle of  the curve, the steep slope  indicates that small 
changes in votes for a candidate leads to relatively large changes in the al- 
location of convention delegates. 
We also allow for candidate bias using a procedure developed by King (in 
press) for multiparty electoral systems. We include a separate bias parameter 
Aj for each candidate j. If the system is not biased, all these parameters will 
be zero; if  Aj > 0, the system is  biased in favor of candidate j, and Aj < 0 
indicates bias against candidate j.  These parameters can be incorporated into 
equation 3 as follows: 
Bias is thus modeled as deviations from partisan symmetry, and both the de- 
gree of candidate bias and electoral responsiveness are key normative fea- 
tures of any presidential nomination system. 
We begin our empirical investigation with an examination of the respon- 
siveness of the parties' nomination systems. Our plan is to first present the 
results on aggregate responsiveness for each year and party. We then analyze 
the effects of  formal rules on responsiveness and finally on candidate bias. 
Aggregate  Responsiceness 
Table 1 presents estimates of the electoral responsiveness of the Demo- 
cratic and Republican contests from 1976 to 1988. The Republican nomina- 
tion in  1984 was uncontested, so the table includes estimates only for the 
remaining seven contests. These analyses reveal several striking patterns. 
First, the Republican presidential  nominating system is  more  responsive 
than the Democratic system for every contest in our sample. This means that 
small changes in preferences among Republicans lead to considerably larger 
variations in the composition of their state delegations to the national con- 
vention. On the other hand, the composition of Democratic state delegations 
is allocated  much more proportionally, with an average responsiveness  of 
only 1.4.  (When the candidates split the vote equally without bias, an addi- 
tional percent of the vote for a candidate yields an extra 1.4% delegates for 
that candidate.) Whereas the highly responsive Republican system usually 
fosters a quick decision in their nomination contest, the Democrats had con- 
ventions that more fully represented minority interests. A candidate in the 
lead with momentum more quickly gathers delegates when p is large than 614  Stephen Ansolabehere and Gary King 
AVERAGE  RESPONSIVENESS  IN DEMOCRATIC  AND REPUBLICAN 
NOMINATION  CONTESTS,  1976- 1988 
- 
Republican  Democratic 
Contests  Contests 
1976  3.641  1.336 
(0.788)  (0.188) 
1980  1.875  1.283 
(0.192)  (0.096) 
1984  Uncontested  1.353 
(0.137) 
1988  1.949  1.610 
(0.426)  (0.120) 
Table entries are values of  /3  and "heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors" in 
parentheses (see Gallant and White 1988). 
when it is small. Of course, high values of p need not always produce quick 
victories, as the 1976 Repubican contest emphasizes. 
Rules and Responsiveness 
In order to test the effect of rules, we use a classification scheme based on 
two basic choices a state has in formulating its presidential nomination rules. 
First, each state party chooses how its citizens will express their candidate 
preferences. Primaries and caucuses are the two main choices. Primary elec- 
tions are held in voting booths throughout the state on a given day. Caucus 
meetings are conducted at the precinct or ward level, and delegates to the 
district level are chosen; at the district caucuses, typically two to three weeks 
after the precinct  meetings,  delegates to the state convention are chosen, 
and the state convention then chooses the state's delegation to the national 
convention. 
Second, after the general choice between primaries and caucuses, a state 
must decide how to aggregate these expressed candidate preferences.  For 
primaries,  the aggregation rules are applied all at once either statewide or 
within  congressional  districts.  For  caucuses,  different  rules  may  apply  to 
each  stage of  delegate selection.  Most  states use  some form  of  PR  rules 
throughout the state or a form of plurality rule applied only within each dis- 
trict. In the former case, if a candidate wins 40% of the statewide vote, he or 
she will theoretically receive 40% of the state's delegates; of course, round- 
ing errors, candiate thresholds, and many other factors can turn PR  rules 
into non-proportional  results. In the latter case, if  a candidate wins a plu- 
rality of votes in a district, he or she takes all of that district's delegates; at the Delegate Selection Rules in Presidential Nominations  615 
national level, this may translate into winner-take-all representation  (if all 
districts vote alike), an effective proportional allocation of delegates to candi- 
dates or some other value of p. 
Specific voting  systems are generally defined by  combining variants of 
these two sorts of rules. Caucuses may be winner-take-all at each level or 
may have a proportionality component.  Primaries  may grant delegates to 
whomever wins a plurality in the district; they may allocate convention votes 
in proportion to the primary vote; or they may give the winning candidate a 
larger share of delegates than his or her vote proportion but still reserving 
some delegates to represent the losers. The national Democratic party now 
requires that all caucuses follow some sort of proportionality rule but allows 
primaries to use either a proportional or district-plurality rule. The Republi- 
cans impose no such uniformity on their caucuses. 
These two choices-caucuses  or primaries for collecting voter preferences 
and PR or non-PR for allocating delegates on the basis of expressed prefer- 
ences-yield  four basic combinations of  state presidential selection rules: 
(1) PR primary, (2) non-PR primary, (3) PR Caucus, and (4) non-PR caucus. 
However, since the national Democratic party prohibits use of non-PR cau- 
cuses and since the Republicans do not usually report the complete first- 
round caucus vote, we combine all caucuses into a single category for further 
analysis in the Democratic party and use only categories (1) and (2) for the 
Republicans. Our data are described in the appendix. 
These three categories, PR primaries, non-PR primaries, and caucuses, 
provide a straightforward and relatively simple guide to the types of rules 
used to select delegates. They are also central to the debate over party re- 
form. Much of the reforms within the Democratic party came as a reaction 
against primaries and the opening of the nominating process (Ceaser 1979, 
chap. 6; Ranney 1975, chap. 4). Primaries are still touted as more represen- 
tative than caucuses, delegate selection in the caucuses presumably remain- 
ing in the control of state party leaders (McGovern-Fraser Commission 1970, 
32). Non-PR rules are likewise criticized as biased against some candidates, 
while PR is supposedly fair to all candidates (McGovern-Fraser Commission 
1970, 44-45;  Mikulski Commission 1973, 5). Changes in the delegate alloca- 
tion rules have allegedly accentuated the differences between the parties. 
The Democrats are said to have drifted toward populist democracy while the 
Republicans have stuck with a system of plurality rule in congressional dis- 
tricts (Ceaser 1979, 276ff). 
Table 2 displays our estimates of the responsiveness of each party's  nomi- 
nation system for various delegate allocation rules. In all election years and 
for both parties, non-PR primaries are always more responsive than PR pri- 
maries. The effect is particularly dramatic for the Republicans. Non-PR val- 
ues are all large, considerably more responsive than a proportional system. 616  Stephen Ansolabehere and Gary King 
Primaries  Primaries  Caucuses 
Republicans 
1976  1.235  6.360 
(0.196)  (1.690) 
1980  1.402  2.533 
(0.138)  (0.373) 
1988  1.450  3.103 
(0.459)  (0.347) 
Democrats 
1976 
All  figures are estimates of p  (with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in paren- 
theses). Because Ronald Reagan ran essentially uncontested in the 1984 primaries, meaningful 
estimates are not possible. 
However, even with PR rules, the system is  consistently more responsive 
than strict proportionality, and significantly so in all but one case. p is proba- 
bly inflated above one because of the of the minimum vote threshold both 
parties impose on minor candidates. 
Several authors claim  that even with a proportionality requirement the 
caucuses remain a restrictive method of delegate selection, approximating 
systems of plurality rule rather than pure PR (Aldrich 1980). However, our 
estimates indicate that the caucuses, rather than the PR-primaries, are the 
bastion of proportionality in the Democratic party. In three of the four years, 
p is lower for the caucuses than for non-PR and PR primaries and is not sig- 
nificantly  different from  1.0, the case  of  strict  empirical  proportionality. 
Thus, despite distortions due to differential  organizational  strength of  the 
candidates and aggregation from precincts up the the state level, caucuses 
tend to approximate proportionality more closely than the primaries do. The 
proportionality  rule  imposed  by  the  Mikulski  Commission  (1973), then, 
seems to have worked exceedingly well in the Democratic caucuses; indeed, 
it has secured proportionality much better than PR in the primaries. 
The difference between the parties in table 2 reveal that the higher aggre- Delegate Selection Rules in Presidential Nominations  617 
gate responsiveness (in table 1)  is mostly due  to extremely high values for the 
Republican  non-PR primaries.  PR primaries are not consistently more re- 
sponsive in either party and no data are available for Republican caucuses. 
We originally hypothesized that some of the dramatic differences between 
the parties were created in the early years by a few winner-take-all states, 
like California. However, when we reestimated the model excluding winner- 
take-all states, our responsiveness estimates decreased only slightly. The dif- 
ferences between the parties in non-PR primaries, appear to be generated 
by  real differences between the primary electorates and party nominating 
systems. 
Candidate Bias 
We move now from a discussion of responsiveness to candidate bias. This 
enables us to evaluate the bias against any individual candidate as well as the 
inherent fairness  of  each party's  nomination  system, even after taking its 
level of responsiveness into account. Table 3 presents these estimates. We 
begin by  evaluating the claims  of  those candidates  who have  specifically 
complained about bias  in delegate selection rules, Ronald Reagan in  1976 
and Jesse Jackson  in  1988. Reagan  claimed that had PR been used exclu- 
sively, he would have won the nomination (David and Ceaser 1980, viii, 54). 
Our results indicate that this complaint was unfounded. In both PR and non- 
PR primaries, our estimates of candidate bias in the 1976 Republican cam- 
paign are relatively precise and not significantly different from zero. Reagan 
thus lost a fair fight, merely failing to receive enough votes to secure a vic- 
tory in delegates. 
Jessie  Jackson  pressed  his  complaints  even  further  than  Reagan.  He 
claimed that non-PR primaries are inherently biased against ideologically ex- 
treme and black candidates and convinced the Democrats to eliminate these 
allocation  rules for  1992 (Cook  1988, 1575-77).  Unlike  Reagan,  Jackson's 
complaints appear correct. The strongest bias against any candidate in any of 
the seven nomination contests we analyzed was that against Jackson  in the 
1988 non-PR primaries. 
While bias does not pervade the primary election system, it certainly may 
frustrate or aid the bid of a particular candidate. In addition, a more general 
pattern that emerges from table 3 is that the eventual winner usually had an 
advantage. As  is widely thought (Lengle and Shafer 1976), rules treat the 
eventual winner neutrally or favor him. Bias in favor of the eventual winner 
exists in at least one category of selection rules, and against at least one other 
candidate, in five of our seven presidential nomination contests. Bias against 
the eventual winner exists in only one race: the competition between Gore 
and Dukakis in the 1988 caucuses. The caucus system favored Gore even 
though Dukakis eventually won. CANDIDATE  BIAS  FOR REPUBLICAN  AND DEMOCRATIC  PRIMARIES  AND 
DEMOCRATIC  CAUCUSES,  1976 TO 1988 
PR  Non-PR 
Primaries  Primaries  Caucuses 
Republicans 
1976 
Redgan v. Ford 
1980 
Bush v. Reagan 
Anderson v. Reagan 
1988 
Dole v. Bush 
Democrats 
1976 
Udall v. Carter 
Wallace v. Carter 
1980 
Kennedv v. Carter 
1984 
Hart v. hiondale 
Jackson v. Mondale 
1988 
Jackson v. Dukakis 
Gore v. Dukakis 
Gephart v. Dukakis 
Tabular  entries are estimates  of  A,  (with  heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors in 
parentheses). No estimates are available for the Republican party caucuses since vote totals are 
not reported. Because Ronald Reagan ran essentially uncontested in the 1984 primaries, mean- 
ingful estimates are not possible. Delegate Selection Rules in Presidential Nominations  619 
The political struggle for party reform has done more than pique the curi- 
osity of academic researchers; it has brought political scientists into an im- 
portant debate and enabled them to have real policy  impact (Kirkpatrick, 
Malbin, Mann, Penniman, and Ranney 1980; Kirkpatrick 1976; Ranney 1975; 
1987; Sanford 1981). Political scientists have advised the parties and helped 
reformers sort out the consequences of  rules changes. Unfortunately, aca- 
demic research has remained unable to predict or even systematically evalu- 
ate the precise consequences of the rules changes. Case studies, descrip- 
tions, and histories have laid out a rich picture of the political struggle for 
party reform, but they provide little unambiguous evidence about the valid- 
ity of  our intuitions3  Our formal statistical model enables us to formalize 
some of  the normative  arguments in  this literature and to estimate from 
existing data two features of the underlying presidential selection system- 
responsiveness and candidate bias. 
We found that specific candidate allocation procedures have markedly dif- 
ferent effects. PR rules produce a system with much lower responsiveness 
than primaries with non-PR rules, but even the imposition of PR does not 
mean that convention delegates are allocated in strict proportion to expressed 
voter preferences. Indeed, and contrary to conventional wisdom, PR rules 
operated much more effectively in the Democratic caucuses than it did in 
that party's primaries. 
We also discovered significant and systematic differences between the two 
parties  selection systems. Whereas the Republican  system was  uniformly 
more  responsive  to changes in  their voters'  preferences,  the Democratic 
system represented minorities more fully. Furthermore, much of this differ- 
ence is  located within  the non-PR primaries. Since these differences be- 
tween the two parties were found within rules categories, they cannot be 
explained simply by the mix of PR and plurality rules chosen by the two par- 
ties; instead, fundamental differences in composition and geographic distri- 
bution of  the Republican and Democratic electorates also generate differ- 
ences between the two systems. 
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We  collected  data from  two  sources.  The vote  percents  and delegate 
counts are the tallies presented in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Re- 
31ndeed, even  the  leading  text  on  the  subject  reaches  similar  conclusions  (Polsby  and 
Wildavsky  1984, 107-108). 620  Stephen Ansolabehere and Gary King 
ports  (annual reports). Unfortunately,  as  Aldrich  (1980, appendix) notes, 
first-round vote totals are not reported along with delegate allocations for the 
Republican caucuses in 1976, and the same is true for 1980. Reagan ran es- 
sentially uncontested in 1984, and, although a portion of the 1988 results are 
available, there are too many exceptions and problems to make them useful 
compared with the Democratic  results. The delegate allocation  rules are 
taken from the reports of the Democratic and Republican National Commit- 
tees. The DNC publishes a report entitled "Delegate Selection Rules for the 
Democratic National Convention" for each convention. The RNC has a simi- 
lar report entitled "Delegate Selection Procedures." 
Details on estimation can be found in King (in press). The log-likelihood 
we estimated is as follows: 
where E,  is the set of candidates competing in state i. Maximizing this equa- 
tion with respect to p, and A,,  . . . , A,  gives the values of these parameters 
that are most likely  to have given us the data we observed (King 1989a). 
Tables 1-3 report these maximum likelihood estimates, along with hetero- 
scedasticity-consistent standard errors (Gallant and White  1988). A  com- 
puter program is available from the authors. 
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